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“REGULATORY DAUBERT”:
A PROPOSAL TO ENHANCE JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF AGENCY SCIENCE BY
INCORPORATING DAUBERT PRINCIPLES
INTO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ALAN CHARLES RAUL* AND JULIE ZAMPA DWYER**
I
INTRODUCTION
In the landmark decision of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1
the United States Supreme Court empowered federal judges to reject irrelevant
or unreliable scientific evidence.  Daubert has given the judiciary a mandate to
foster “good science” in the courtroom and to reject expert testimony not
grounded in scientific methods and procedures.  Federal agencies—in particu-
lar, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)—have been widely criti-
cized for lacking a commitment to sound science.  Too often, federal courts
have upheld agency decisions that are based on faulty scientific evidence or
unsupported assumptions and conclusions.  The courts’ responsibility to engage
in meaningful judicial review of agency action, together with Congress’s recent
directive calling for agencies to issue data quality guidelines, strongly points to
the need for a mechanism to enable more rigorous, consistent review of agency
science.
Daubert provides a suitable framework for reviewing the quality of agency
science and the soundness of agency decisions consistent with the standards
established for review of agency rulemakings under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (“APA”).2  While the Daubert line of cases arises in connection with
the admissibility of evidence in litigation governed by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the same “good science” rationale should also apply to judicial review of
the science underlying regulatory decisionmaking.  Indeed, if private litigants
are entitled to rules requiring sound science to protect parochial interests, cer-
tainly the public should be equally assured that good science is the foundation
for national action.  The regulatory science used to justify agency decisions that
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1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000).
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commit society’s public resources and allocate social priorities should be no less
rigorous than the litigation science that is currently tested according to the
methods and procedures prescribed in Daubert.
To date, two courts have specifically rejected the application of Daubert in
cases governed by the APA, 3 and no court has directly accepted the proposition
that Daubert principles should apply in the context of administrative law.  In
1999, however, a D.C. Circuit judge on the panel that decided American
Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA cited Daubert favorably in his dissenting
opinion.4  In Daubert itself, the Supreme Court cited and relied on a scholarly
book by a former EPA official discussing regulatory science.5  One would there-
fore imagine that the Supreme Court would be receptive to extending Daubert
principles to review of federal agency science.  Indeed, the criteria for judicial
review of agency action established in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.6 and its progeny under the APA are sub-
stantively consistent with the “relevance” and “reliability” themes of Daubert.
This Article argues that Daubert principles should apply to the review of
agency rulemaking under the APA because these principles are consistent with
the APA requirement that agencies engage in reasoned decisionmaking, would
assure better documentation of agencies’ scientific decisions, and would
enhance the rigor and predictability of judicial review of agency action based on
scientific evidence.  Judges would evaluate the scientific methods and proce-
dures employed by agencies but would not substitute their own policy prefer-
ences or conclusions for those chosen by the agencies.  The fundamental goal of
“regulatory Daubert” is, quite simply, to encourage reviewing judges to be less
deferential, and thus more probing, of agency science and related administra-
tive justifications for regulatory action.
Incorporating Daubert principles into administrative law would improve
agency decisionmaking and enhance accountability.  Agencies would be com-
pelled to identify the most reliable and relevant scientific evidence for the issue
at hand and disclose the default assumptions, policy choices, and factual uncer-
tainties therein.  Applying Daubert in the administrative context would refine
judicial review of agency science, resulting in greater consistency and rigor.
II
REGULATORY ABUSE OF SCIENCE
The federal environmental, health, and safety statutes require administra-
tive agencies to decide how and when to regulate based on scientific, quantita-
3. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 622 (7th Cir. 1995); Stewart v. Potts, 996 F. Supp. 668
(S.D. Tex. 1998).
4. 175 F.3d 1027, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Tatel, J., dissenting), rev’d in part on other grounds,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
5. 509 U.S. at 593 (citing SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS
POLICYMAKERS 61-76 (1990)).
6. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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tive, and other technical methods of analysis.7  Although good science is crucial
to sound, efficient, and effective regulations, agency decisions too often either
disregard scientific evidence or reflect public policy considerations merely
masked as science.
EPA, in particular, has faced attack for its misuse of science in its policies
and decisionmaking.  It is frequently perceived as adjusting science to fit policy
and has itself acknowledged that its treatment of science needs attention.
Former EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman has publicly stated that
“improv[ing] the role of science in decision-making” is one of EPA’s top budget
priorities.8  In 1992, EPA’s own expert panel issued a report to then-Adminis-
trator William K. Reilly on the role of science at EPA, entitled Safeguarding the
Future: Credible Science, Credible Decisions.9  In that report, the expert panel
stated:
EPA has not always assured that contrasting, reputable scientific views are well
explored and well documented from the beginning to the end of the regulatory proc-
ess . . . EPA science is perceived by many people, both inside and outside the Agency, to
be adjusted to fit policy.  Such “adjustments” could be made consciously or uncon-
sciously by the scientists or decision-maker.10
A. Pervasive Criticisms of EPA Science
Academics and others have criticized EPA for the poor quality of its scien-
tific analyses as well as its practice of obscuring its assumptions by disguising
policy-based decisions as scientific ones.  Professor E. Donald Elliott, for exam-
ple, has documented the “decline of science as an important determinant in
environmental decisionmaking.”11  There is a consensus among observers that,
“[i]n general, scientists have little stature and power within EPA.  Instead, those
with the power to make and influence decisions tend to have an inclination
toward law and politics.”12  Professor Wendy E. Wagner has noted that “camou-
7. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (2000); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7401 (2000); Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
8. Pat Phibbs, EPA: IG Staff to Discuss Pending Investigation Into How Science Is Used in EPA
Rulemaking, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No. 165, at A-28 (Aug. 27, 2001); see also Pat Phibbs,
Fisher Wants EPA’s Top Scientists, Advisors to Focus Together on Most Important Issues, Daily Rep.
for Executives (BNA), No. 230, at A-15 (Dec. 3, 2001) (discussing the deputy administrator of EPA’s
call for the Science Policy Council to have a more direct role in overseeing EPA science).
9. EXPERT PANEL ON THE ROLE OF SCIENCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
SAFEGUARDING THE FUTURE: CREDIBLE SCIENCE, CREDIBLE DECISIONS (1992).
10. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
11. E. Donald Elliott et al., Science, Agencies, and the Courts: Is Three a Crowd?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,125, 10,126 (2001).  Professor Elliott remarked that this critique of agency decision-
making is the subtext of Justice Stephen Breyer’s groundbreaking book BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).
12. See MARK R. POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 18
(1999).  For further commentary on the flaws in EPA’s approach to science, see Elevating EPA to
Cabinet Status: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Res. & Regulatory Affairs,
House Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong. (2001) (statements of Robert W. Hahn and Ran-
dall Lutter) [hereinafter Hahn Testimony] (making several recommendations for improvements in
EPA’s science); ANGUS MACBETH ET AL., NAT’L LEGAL CTR. FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, CARTOON
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flaging controversial policy decisions as science assists the agency in evading
various political, legal, and institutional forces.”13
Congress has also expressed concerns over the inadequacy of EPA science
and has taken steps toward addressing the situation.14  For example, at a July
2000 hearing before the House Government Reform Committee’s Subcommit-
tee on Energy and Environment concerning the results of the National
Research Council (“NRC”) report entitled Strengthening Science at the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Subcommittee Chairman Ken Calvert
expressed concern that “[r]ather than the best science driving regulatory policy
at EPA, regulatory policy drives scientific activity and can prejudice scientific
conclusions.”15  He said of the NRC’s findings:
The [NRC] notes that science is ‘an important part of the basis for many Agency
decisions and actions, but has not been the only basis and in many cases, has not even
been a major determinant of EPA’s decisions.’  Frankly, this troubles me.  The EPA
has gone to great lengths to convince Congress that it is a science agency.  This report
calls into doubt EPA’s commitment to sound science.
. . . .
. . . We found many specific instances where EPA has not conducted adequate
research or used readily available research data.16
In response to the NRC report, on October 3, 2001, the House Science
Committee approved a bill to create a deputy administrator of science and
technology at EPA.17  The bill passed the House of Representatives on April 30,
SCIENCE: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN POLITICS AND SCIENCE AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY (2002) (documenting EPA’s poor use of science through an examination of the agency’s
regulation of PCBs under the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Clean Water Act).
13. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613,
1617 (1995); see also Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376 (1998) (“An
agency should not be able to impede judicial review, and indeed even political oversight, by disguising
its policy making as fact finding.”); Wagner, supra, at 1628 (“If policy decisions are to receive appropri-
ate public scrutiny, science–policy decisionmakers must be extremely forthright in distinguishing policy
judgments from scientific facts.”).
14. The most significant action recently taken by Congress is the provision in a 2001 appropriations
bill calling for the creation of new Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) data quality guidelines.
See infra Part IV.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has also considered action to improve agency science.  William L.
Kovacs, its vice president, recently called upon Congress to require EPA to develop standards for
sound science.  See Pat Phibbs, Chamber of Commerce Seeks to Develop Consensus Definition of
“Sound Science,” 33 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1674 (July 26, 2002).  Kovacs has identified sixteen components
of a sound science model: that science be documented, rational, comprehensive, factual, reliable, peer
reviewed, appropriate, qualified, reproducible, validated, objective, archivable, understandable,
communicable, adequate, and responsive.  EPA Cabinet Elevation: Agency and Stakeholder Views:
Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Res. & Regulatory Affairs, Comm. on
Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 15-18 (2002) (statement of William L. Kovacs, Vice President, U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce) [hereinafter Kovacs Testimony].  Though Kovacs applauds OMB’s data quality
guidelines, he urges Congress to go still further to require agencies to use sound science.  He urges a
legislative mandate directed to EPA that would compel the agency to improve its science.
15. Strengthening Science at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Energy and Env’t, House Comm. on Sci., 106th Cong. 2 (2000) (statement of Rep. Ken
Calvert, Chairman, Subcomm. on Energy & Env’t) [hereinafter Calvert Testimony].
16. Id. at 1-2.
17. H.R. 64, 107th Cong. § 1(a)(2) (2001); see also House Committee Approves Bill to Create
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2002,18 and was referred to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works on May 1, 2002.19  Representative Vernon Ehlers, who introduced the
bill, noted that EPA’s science has met with criticism from regulated industries
and environmental advocates alike.20  Moreover, according to Ehlers, “Members
of Congress and the judiciary do not have confidence that the agency uses
science appropriately in its decisions.”21
The bill provides that the deputy administrator “shall coordinate and over-
see the science and technology activities of the agency and ensure that agency
decisions are informed by the results of appropriate and relevant research.”22
This authority includes providing advice to the EPA administrator regarding
science and technology issues, participating in the development of the agency’s
science- and technology-based policies, coordinating the acquisition and com-
pilation of relevant science and technology information, establishing guidelines
for the dissemination of research results to the public (with particular emphasis
on reaching minority and rural communities), and developing guidelines for
peer review of science.23  The Senate failed to take action on the bill before
Congress adjourned, however, and the bill has not yet been reintroduced in the
108th Congress.
Through detailed reports and analyses, the General Accounting Office
(“GAO”) has consistently documented EPA’s faulty scientific methods as well
as its practice of obscuring the policy-based reasons for some of its decisions.24
GAO recently noted concern among observers “about whether [EPA and
other] agencies’ procedures and assumptions are sufficiently transparent,
thereby providing decision-makers and the public with adequate information
about the scientific and policy bases for agencies’ risk estimates as well as the
limitations and uncertainties associated with those estimates.”25  GAO has also
cited gaps and inaccuracies in EPA data that further compromise the agency’s
ability to assess risks and set risk-based priorities.26  These gaps, in part, explain
Agency Deputy Administrator for Science, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 191, at A-16 (Oct. 4,
2001).
18. Act of April 30, 2002, H.R. 64 107th Cong.
19. See id.





24. GAO has “identified several weaknesses in EPA’s science programs over the years, including
(1) the uneven implementation of peer review procedures for EPA’s scientific and technical products,
(2) gaps in scientific data, and (3) the lack of performance goals and measures that show the environ-
mental results of EPA’s science activities.”  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. 00-270,
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT: INFORMATION ON SCIENCE ISSUES IN EPA’S
PERFORMANCE REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999 AND PERFORMANCE PLANS FOR FISCAL YEARS
2000 AND 2001 (2000) [hereinafter GAO, GOV’T PERFORMANCE & RESULTS ACT].
25. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHEMICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 19 (2001) [hereinafter GAO,
CHEMICAL RISK]
26. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION: EPA NEEDS
BETTER INFORMATION TO MANAGE RISKS AND MEASURE RESULTS 2 (2000); see also GAO, GOV’T
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EPA’s heavy reliance on assumptions.27
Although relying on assumptions may be inevitable when scientific knowl-
edge is incomplete, EPA has been criticized for continually and indiscriminately
operating from extremely conservative assumptions, enabling misguided regula-
tory decisionmaking.28  GAO cautions that “using such precautionary assump-
tions . . . could produce overly optimistic estimates of the benefits of regulatory
actions.”29  EPA’s practice of choosing conservative default options is of par-
ticular concern when it can be a mechanism for disguising policy choices.30
GAO has recognized this failing and called for transparency in risk assessments
as well as in EPA guidance documents.31
PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT, supra note 24, at 3 (“EPA lacks fundamental environmental and
scientific data about pollutants and their effects on human health and the environment.”  In an attempt
to address such problems, “EPA established the Office of Environmental Information in October
1999.”).
27. Indeed, issuing regulations based on inadequate information or policy preferences can be lik-
ened to deceptive advertising, which is prohibited by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000); both have the capacity to foster misinformation and deceive the public.  It is clear
from the Federal Trade Commission’s approach to deceptive practices that EPA’s pattern of disguising
policy as science would not pass muster if it were product advertising.  The FTC has properly taken an
aggressive stance against deception, which includes misrepresentations or omissions.  See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION (1983), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/
ad-decept.htm.  Product claims that cannot be supported with sufficient science or other evidence
violate the FTC Act’s prohibition against unfair or deceptive acts or practices.  Information dissemi-
nated by federal agencies such as EPA, which are obligated to act in the public interest, can be held to
no less high a standard.
28. E.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. 01-55, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY: USE OF PRECAUTIONARY ASSUMPTION IN HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENTS AND BENEFITS
ESTIMATES 5 (2000) [hereinafter GAO, PRECAUTIONARY ASSUMPTION].  The precautionary principle
encourages regulatory action when a suspected risk cannot be proven with scientific certainty but the
risks of inaction might be great.  But uncertainty cannot properly be used as a crutch to justify action
whenever data are unavailable.
29. Id.
30. See POWELL, supra note 12, at 29-30 (discussing risk assessment at EPA and noting that EPA’s
risk assessment guidelines “place increasing burdens on EPA decisionmakers to exercise their science
and policy judgment and create new opportunities for the exercise of administrative discretion”); id. at
81 (“A commonality among [EPA’s] regulatory programs . . . has been their reluctance to come to grips
with scientific uncertainty in a meaningful way.”); Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, The Time Has
Come for Reconsidering the Role of Generic Default Assumptions Based on “Conservative Policy
Choice” in Scientific Risk Assessments, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,873, 10,873-74 (2001).  See
generally AM. CROP PROTECTION ASS’N, AN APPROACH FOR ADDRESSING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (1999).
Of course, EPA is neither unique nor entirely unjustified in subscribing to conservative approaches
to regulation.  OMB, the regulator of the regulators, has also expressed support for the precautionary
principle, when properly applied.  John D. Graham, the current director of OMB’s regulatory review
office, has stated that public concern about perceived risks should play a role in agency science.  See
OMB’s Graham Concedes Public Concerns, Science Both Relevant to Risk Assessments, Reg. L. &
Econ. (BNA) No. 09, at A-27 (Jan. 14, 2002).  Graham contends that even though conservative
assumptions may be warranted, the need for caution does not excuse the obligation to use good science.
Scientific and procedural safeguards should be used when the precautionary principle is invoked.  See
id.
31. See GAO, CHEMICAL RISK, supra note 25, at 13, 45; GAO, PRECAUTIONARY ASSUMPTION,
supra note 28, at 7 (“We are recommending that, in developing its final rule on arsenic, EPA fully dis-
close and analyze the impact of the key precautionary health assumptions used in its benefits esti-
mate.”); see also BREYER, supra note 11, at 11 (describing the phenomenon of “tunnel vision,”
whereby agencies promulgate extremely stringent standards that result in high costs with limited addi-
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B. Inadequate Extra-judicial Checks on the Regulatory Process
The shortcomings of agency science demonstrate that effective oversight of
the regulatory process is imperative.  Many of the extra-judicial mechanisms
established for ensuring agency accountability unfortunately suffer from defi-
ciencies that render them inadequate by themselves to resolve the pervasive-
ness of poor quality science.
1. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
In 1995, Professor Wendy Wagner published an important article docu-
menting agency abuse of science entitled The Science Charade of Toxic Risk
Regulation,32 exposing the “pervasive ‘science charade’—in which agencies exag-
gerate the contributions made by science in setting toxic standards in order to
avoid accountability for the underlying policy decisions.”33  Professor Wagner
explained that agencies shield themselves behind this charade, couching their
proposed rules in hypertechnical terms so as to limit the public’s ability to
understand and participate in the rulemaking process.34  Obscuring the true
bases for agencies’ decisions and overstating the role of science in decision-
making limits the public’s ability to participate meaningfully in the notice-and-
comment process.  The “science charade” can thus significantly undercut the
effectiveness of public input in agency rulemaking.
2. Peer Review
The peer-review process is designed to provide internal agency checks on
science-based decisionmaking.35  Though peer review is an important compo-
nent of the scientific process, the nature of peer review and the documented
flaws in the peer-review process at EPA render it insufficient to remedy prob-
lems with agency science or to ensure reasoned decisionmaking.36  A recent
NRC report highlights the deficiencies in EPA’s peer-review policy and demon-
strates that the agency’s current approach is an inadequate protection against
conflicts of interest between its project managers and its peer-review leaders.37
Moreover, EPA largely views peer review as a bureaucratic requirement, rather
than as an integral part of agency culture.38  GAO has also found that “further
improvements are needed to expand the scope of peer reviews [at EPA] and
make them more independent,”39 and that the implementation of EPA’s peer-
tional benefits).
32. Wagner, supra note 13, at 1613.
33. Id. at 1617.
34. Id. at 1656-57.
35. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING SCIENCE AT THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: RESEARCH-MANAGEMENT AND PEER-REVIEW PRACTICE
22 (2000) [hereinafter NRC REPORT].
36. Id. at 1-2.
37. See id. at 102-08.
38. Id. at 103-04.
39. GAO, GOV’T PERFORMANCE & RESULTS ACT, supra note 24, at 3.
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review policy has been “uneven.”40  Even when the peer-review process func-
tions well, it does not guarantee that agencies will rely upon good science.41
Peer review is not a replacement for utilizing good science from the inception of
the scientific process:
[I]n many cases, end-of-the-line review cannot repair mistakes or omissions made
early in the regulatory development process or fill data gaps.  Back-end inspection
may be able to identify scientific uncertainties, but rarely can it reduce them.  The
benefits of regulatory science quality control must also be balanced against the poten-
tial for peer reviewers to intrude on the policy domain.  If determining whether the
data and analysis are adequate for regulatory decisionmaking is the problem, then
peer review does not solve the problem.  It shifts the problem from decisionmakers to
reviewers.42
3. Congressional Oversight
Congressional controls such as appropriations and monitoring activities can,
to a certain degree, constrain agency actions.43  The pervasive agency practice of
disguising policy judgments as science, however, effectively shields agency offi-
cials from intense scrutiny by Congress.44  Scholars have also questioned the true
extent of congressional power over agencies, noting the limited ability of Con-
gress to impose effective, post-decision sanctions against agency action.45
4. Congressional Repeal
The Congressional Review Act provides that agencies must submit certain
regulations to Congress sixty days before they are scheduled to take effect.46
Since the Statute’s enactment in 1996, however, Congress has passed only one
resolution of disapproval.47  Moreover, the legislature’s difficulty in reaching
40. Id.
41. See NRC REPORT, supra note 35, at 172; see also Bad Science, ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb. 2002, at 28
(discussing the deficiencies in EPA’s peer review process).
42. POWELL, supra note 12, at 139.  A stark example of the limits of peer review is found in the
recent discovery that a Bell Labs scientist falsified data regarding molecular-scale transistors.  Before
the data were deemed falsified, the work by that scientist had been touted as a major scientific break-
through.  In discussing why this deception was initially successful, commentators cited the limitations of
the peer review process.  Peer review screens for scientific errors, but presupposes that the data
obtained are honest.  See Kenneth Chang, Panel Says Bell Labs Scientist Faked Discoveries, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at A2.  Flaws attributable to improperly manipulated data therefore are not
likely to be detected by the peer-review process.  See Peter N. Spotts, Science Labs, Too, ‘Cooking the
Books,’ CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 19, 2002, at 1.
43. See  Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm and EPA in the
Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,371, at 10386 (2001).
44. See Wagner, supra note 13, at 1669-71.  In a later, noteworthy article, Professor Wagner dis-
cussed the limits Congress faces when it attempts to enact effective environmental legislation.  Wendy
E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181 (1999).
45. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2259 (2001) (“[T]he
evidence of dominance is doubtful at best.  The empirical work of the public choice theorists, purport-
ing to show that agencies routinely comply with legislative agendas, has come under sharp fire.”).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(A) (2000).
47. See Kagan, supra note 45, at 2257 (referring to the repeal of the Ergonomics Program, which
had threatened to impose burdensome regulations on employers, without a scientific consensus as to
what actually caused ergonomic impairments).
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consensus handicaps its ability to respond to agency regulations.48
5. OMB Review of Agency Rules
With Executive Order 12,866, President Clinton directed agencies to prom-
ulgate regulations only when strictly necessary and to consider the costs and
benefits of available regulatory alternatives.49  Significant regulatory actions are
to be submitted to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”)
for review and comment before publication.50  Despite this oversight function,
OIRA’s ultimate impact on agency regulations is necessarily marginal.  While
executive branch review can rein in and potentially improve regulations at the
margin, eleventh-hour review by the small staff at OIRA cannot realistically
work significant improvements in complicated regulations developed over
months or years, and such review certainly cannot remedy major defects in sci-
entific data or methodology.  Moreover, agencies will not always heed executive
branch input.  EPA, for example, proceeded to issue its proposed Clean Air Act
“national ambient air quality standards” (“NAAQS”) for ozone despite strong
criticism from several executive branch offices that EPA significantly under-
stated the true costs of attainment, conducted insufficient scientific analysis, and
failed to support its new standards with adequate data.51
6. The Data Quality Guidelines
On January 3, 2002, OMB released its “Guidelines for Ensuring and
Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information
Disseminated by Federal Agencies.”52  The Guidelines were issued pursuant to
a congressional directive in the Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 200153 and evince congressional concern
with the quality of agency science.  These Guidelines are entirely consistent
with the aims of regulatory Daubert, and in fact heighten the need for Daubert-
type review of agency science; courts must ensure that the Guidelines are fully
and effectively implemented by compelling agencies to fulfill their new quality-
of-information mandate.
The Guidelines are intended to establish greater accountability for the
quality of agency data.  They require each agency to issue its own guidelines
“ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of infor-
mation (including statistical information) disseminated by the agency.”54  Agen-
48. See Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental Protection, 24
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 664 (2001) (offering reasons for failures in environmental policy).
49. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2000).
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., Michael Fumento, Polluted Science, REASON ONLINE, Aug./Sept. 1997, at
http://reason.com/9708/fe.fumento.shtml.
52. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Information Quality Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. 369 (Jan. 3, 2002),
reissued with corrections, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002).
53. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515 (2002).
54. Information Quality Guidelines, supra note 52.
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cies are directed to adopt a basic standard of quality, one akin to the “best
available science” standard of the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”),55 to
review the quality of information before disseminating it.56  Agencies must also
use “sound statistical and research methods” when generating data and devel-
oping results.57  Results must be capable of being substantially reproduced.58  A
primary purpose of the Guidelines—and one that comports with sound public-
policy decisionmaking—is to encourage agencies to adopt a good-science foun-
dation before committing to a particular decision.59  Importantly, the Guidelines
request that agencies identify any sources of error that would affect quality, and
that they make data and models publicly available.60
Agencies are required by the Guidelines to create administrative mecha-
nisms that allow the public to request the correction of information dissemi-
nated by agencies, and the agencies have to report to OMB on complaints
regarding information quality.61  These requirements allow access to agency
review prior to the issuance of a final regulation.  They also suggest that parties
may be able to seek federal court review of an agency’s refusal to correct infor-
mation.62  The Guidelines enhance existing means for affected parties to expose
deficiencies in agency science, thereby enabling industry groups to combat
excessive deference.63  Federal courts must be prepared to test the relevance and
reliability of agency science; they must aim to ensure that the requirements of
quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity are met.
On October 2, 2002, EPA issued its own Data Quality Guidelines.64  In its
guidelines, EPA states that it will address the OMB guidelines by “foster[ing]
the continuous improvement of existing information quality activities and pro-
grams.”65  According to EPA, it already has “numerous systems and practices in
place that address the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information.”66
EPA seemingly intends to rely on its existing mechanisms in lieu of overhauling
its current system, while attempting to shelter itself from judicial review.
As soon as EPA’s draft guidelines were released, commenters began to




59. See, e.g., OMB Guidelines on Quality of Information Seen as Having Profound Impact on
Agencies, Reg. L. & Econ. (BNA) No. 09, at C-1 (Jan. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Profound Impact].
60. See id.
61. See id. at 376.
62. See Profound Impact, supra note 59.
63. See OMB Data-Quality Guidance to Bolster Attacks on EPA Rules, RISK POLICY REP. (Inside
Washington Publishers, Arlington, Va.), Jan. 21, 2002, at 12 (discussing the likely impact of the Guide-
lines on challenges to agency rulemaking).
64. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR ENSURING AND MAXIMIZING THE
QUALITY, OBJECTIVITY, UTILITY, AND INTEGRITY OF INFORMATION DISSEMINATED BY THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/oei/quality/guidelines
/EPA-OEI-IQG-FINAL-10-2002.pdf [hereinafter EPA GUIDELINES].
65. Id. at 10.
66. Id.
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express doubt about the fidelity of EPA’s guidelines to those of OMB.  The
final guidelines are substantially the same as the draft version and do not allay
those initial misgivings.  Of particular concern is that, rather than simply
adopting the best-available, peer-reviewed science standard of the SDWA, as
recommended in the OMB guidelines, EPA has decided to adapt the quality
principles of the SDWA and will use the best science available upon assess-
ment, together with data “collected by accepted methods” or “best available
methods.”67  Moreover, EPA will only use these principles “to the extent practi-
cable.”68  EPA thus specifically rejected commenters’ recommendations that
EPA adopt rather than adapt the SDWA principles.  EPA also created a signifi-
cant loophole with regard to information-correction requests, as “the Agency
may need to weigh the resources needed and the potential delay associated with
incorporating additional information in comparison to the value of the new
information in terms of its potential to improve the substance and presentation
of the assessment.”69
The EPA guidelines are somewhat encouraging in that, in each document
made available to the public, EPA will specify “each significant uncertainty
identified in the process of the assessment of risk and studies that would assist
in resolving the uncertainty.”70  Due to the other deficiencies, however, on
balance, the EPA guidelines dilute the most potentially efficacious aspects of
the OMB guidelines.  In a letter to Administrator Whitman raising their con-
cerns about EPA’s draft guidelines, Congressmen Billy Tauzin and Paul
Gillmor asserted that “EPA’s proposal would be inconsistent with law and . . .
leaves completely open-ended loopholes for EPA not to follow the SDWA
principles or any principles of objectivity.”71  Among other problems, while the
OMB guidelines state that agencies must ensure objectivity, EPA has deter-
mined that it merely “should” do so.72  The OMB guidelines contain no justifica-
tion for attempting compliance only “to the extent practicable,”73 as EPA has
described its own obligations.
EPA has also attempted to circumvent judicial review by characterizing its
guidelines as a nonbinding guidance document.  EPA states in its guidelines:
Our Guidelines reflect EPA’s best effort to present our goals and commitments for
ensuring and maximizing the quality of information we disseminate.  As such, they are
not a regulation and do not change or substitute for any legal requirements.  They
provide non-binding policy and procedural guidance, and are therefore not intended
67. Id. at 22.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 23.
70. Id. at 23.
71. Letter from W.J. “Billy” Tauzin and Paul E. Gillmor to Christine Todd Whitman, Administra-
tor, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency 2 (June 7, 2002) (on file with author); see also Pat Phibbs, Environ-
ment Regulatory Information Should Be Subject To Correction Mechanism, Industry Tells EPA, Reg.,
L. & Econ. (BNA) No. 95, at A-37 (May 16, 2002) [hereinafter Environment Regulatory Information]
(“On too many margins EPA has provided itself loopholes, provisos, escape clauses, definitional advan-
tages and other artful dodges.”) (quoting Richard Belzer, President, Regulatory Checkbook).
72. See EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at 3.
73. Id. at 22.
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to create legal rights, impose legally binding requirements or obligations on EPA or
the public when applied in particular situations, or change or impact the status of
information we disseminate, nor to contravene any other legal requirements that may
apply to particular agency determinations or other actions.74
The availability of judicial review of actions taken under the guidelines will
undoubtedly be a hotly contested and perhaps a highly litigated subject.  The
express requirement in the OMB guidelines that agencies establish internal
review mechanisms through which affected parties may contest quality-of-infor-
mation decisions certainly gives rise to a legitimate claim that final agency deci-
sions on such complaints should be subject to further review in the federal
courts.  Moreover, if a request for information correction relates to information
that is already the subject of a public notice-and-comment rulemaking, EPA
will generally address the request within the ordinary rulemaking process.75
Thus, it is inevitable that certain information correction requests will ultimately,
if indirectly, be subject to judicial review in the course of challenges to EPA
rulemakings.  Regardless of the outcome of the prospective judicial review
debate, even those courts that are not hearing challenges brought under the
guidelines must provide meaningful review that gives effect to explicit congres-
sional intent to heighten the standards for agency science.  EPA’s apparent
measures to resist the most potent aspects of OMB’s attempt to reform agency
science increase the need for probing judicial review.
7. The Nondelegation Doctrine
The need for effective judicial review is even more imperative in the wake
of Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.,76 in which the Supreme Court
held that the Clean Air Act’s requirement that EPA set the national ambient
air quality standards “requisite to protect the public health” did not effect an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.77  American Trucking makes it
abundantly clear that the nondelegation doctrine is virtually obsolete and that
agencies have a free hand to exercise legislative power to fashion regulatory
policies.78  Agencies accordingly have broad power to exercise legislative-type
functions.79  Courts must therefore ensure agency accountability in the exercise
of such otherwise unchecked power.
74. Id. at 4.
75. See id. at 32.  Commenters have criticized EPA for refusing to separately review information
correction requests that are also subject to public comment.  See, e.g., Environment Regulatory Infor-
mation, supra note 71.  Concerns about the quality of information incorporated into agency rules served
as a major impetus for the OMB guidelines.  See id.  EPA should not be able to evade the review and
correction requirement by relegating such problems to the rulemaking process.
76. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
77. Id. at 486.
78. But cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000) (holding that
agencies may not exercise authority to set regulatory policy when Congress has withheld jurisdiction
over the matter the agency seeks to regulate).
79. See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t would be both wiser and
more faithful to what we have actually done in delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking
authority is ‘legislative power.’”).
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C. Federal Courts’ Criticisms of the Improper Use of Science
Given their responsibility as the last bulwark of regulatory accountability,
federal courts provide a necessary forum for evaluating agency science and
scientific decisionmaking.  When called upon to review agency decisions,
federal courts routinely—though unpredictably—strike down agency actions
because of flawed science or methodologies, and in the course of doing so,
remark upon the inadequacy of agency science.
In Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA,80 for exam-
ple, a federal district court rejected EPA’s risk assessment classifying
secondhand smoke as a Group A carcinogen pursuant to the Radon Research
Act.81  That assessment had appeared in an EPA report that analyzed the effects
of secondhand smoke.  The court determined that in conducting its assessment,
EPA demonstrated a “complete disregard of statutory procedure,”82 and
engineered its methodologies to produce its desired policy outcome.83  The court
denounced EPA for “publicly committ[ing] to a conclusion before research had
begun” and “adjust[ing] established procedure and scientific norms to validate
the Agency’s public conclusion.”84  The court also criticized EPA for “cherry
pick[ing]” its data in order to confirm its a priori hypothesis.85
In Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA,86 another noteworthy decision, the court
severely criticized EPA for issuing a pollution discharge permit that did not
include a mixing zone analysis.  Citing Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,87 the court deemed EPA’s decision irra-
tional and discriminatory.88  The agency’s action required an explanation “other
than a mechanical desire to reach a rapid conclusion without regard to whether
the result is sound.”89
The persistence of EPA’s inadequate methodologies and misguided treat-
ment of science in decisionmaking has given rise to a pervasive sentiment that
EPA displays a defiant attitude toward science.90  In Chemical Manufacturers
Ass’n v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit struck down a Clean Air Act rule by finding that
80. 4 F. Supp. 2d 435 (M.D.N.C. 1998), rev’d 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000).
82. 4 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
83. Id. at 456.
84. Id. at 465-66.
85. Id. at 460-62.  Four years later, the Fourth Circuit reversed the case on other grounds.  Specifi-
cally, the court found that the report did not constitute final agency action because it lacked legal and
direct consequences.  Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir.
2002).  The court therefore found that the agency’s action was not reviewable.  Id. at 862.  This decision
would appear to conflict with other recent discussions on reviewability.  See Tozzi v. United States, 271
F.3d 301 (D.C. Cir. 2001); infra Part IV.B. (discussing cases).  But see Thomas O. McGarity, On the
Prospect of “Daubertizing” Judicial Review of Risk Assessment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155
(Autumn 2003).
86. 8 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 1993).
87. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
88. 8 F.3d at 78.
89. Id. at 79.
90. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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EPA arbitrarily and capriciously designated a chemical as a high-risk air pollut-
ant on the basis of a gas dispersion model that bore no rational relationship to
the physical properties of the chemical.  Indeed, the chemical was a solid, not a
gas, within the relevant temperature range.91  The court criticized the agency for
its speculative factual assertions that “bespeak[ ] a ‘let them eat cake’ attitude
that ill-becomes an administrative agency whose obligation to the public it
serves is discharged if only it avoids being arbitrary and capricious.”92  The D.C.
Circuit has had repeated occasions to reject EPA’s scientific models when they
“bea[r] no rational relationship to the reality they purpor[t] to represent.”93
The above discussion demonstrates that courts are fully capable of, and
well-suited to, discovering flaws in agency science and mitigating the conse-
quences by ordering agencies to remedy defects and to engage in more rea-
soned decisionmaking.  This role is entirely consistent with courts’ obligation to
engage in meaningful judicial review.  Moreover, nonjudicial checks on the
regulatory process have proven inadequate to reform agency science.
III
APPLYING DAUBERT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY SCIENCE
Probing judicial review is a necessary check on agency discretion.  Courts
presently lack a consistent or coherent framework for performing this impor-
tant function.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.94 sets forth several
sound principles for review of science that can be usefully extrapolated to the
regulatory context.
A. The Daubert Decision
In Daubert, the Supreme Court articulated the current standard for admit-
ting expert scientific testimony at trial.  Before admitting such evidence, the dis-
trict court must exercise a screening or “gatekeeping”95 function to ensure that
proffered scientific evidence is both relevant and reliable.96  The inquiry focuses
on “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scien-
tifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts at issue.”97  Scientific evidence offered by expert witnesses is
“relevant” if it is sufficiently tied to the facts at hand to “fit,” be “helpful,” or be
“scientifically valid” for the purposes for which it is offered.98  To be deemed
“reliable,” evidence must also involve scientific knowledge “ground[ed] in the
91. Id. at 1264.
92. Id. at 1266.
93. Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also, e.g., Columbia Falls Aluminum
Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
94. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
95. The court’s screening function was later referred to as a “gatekeeper” role in General Electric
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997).
96. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
97. Id. at 592.
98. Id. at 591-93.
010904 RAUL.DOC 02/11/04  4:16 PM
Autumn 2003] REGULATORY DAUBERT 21
methods and procedures of science.”99  Factors pertinent to this analysis include
whether the theory or technique under review has been tested or subjected to
peer review.100  The Court emphasized that the inquiry is intended to be a flexi-
ble one.101
Daubert expressly forbids judges to draw their own scientific conclusions
and thus prohibits judges from substituting their conclusions for those of scien-
tists or other experts.  Rather, judges scrutinize only “principles and methodol-
ogy, not . . . the conclusions that they generate.”102
Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Daubert continue to reaffirm its
validity and to expand upon its principles.  General Electric Co. v. Joiner103
stands for the proposition that a trial judge’s decision to admit or to exclude
expert testimony can be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.  A judge may
exercise discretion to exclude evidence when there is “too great an analytical
gap between the data” and the opinion or conclusion proffered.104  The Court in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael105 extended the gatekeeping obligation of Dau-
bert to testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge.  In Weis-
gram v. Marley Co., the Court held that an appellate court may enter judgment
as a matter of law when it determines, in applying Daubert analysis, that evi-
dence was erroneously admitted at trial, provided that the remaining evidence
would be insufficient to support a judgment.106  After Daubert, “parties relying
on expert evidence have had notice of the exacting standards of reliability such
evidence must meet.”107
If Daubert were applied in the regulatory context, agency accountability
would be increased.  Agencies such as EPA would be obligated to rely on sci-
ence that is scientifically valid for the material issues being decided by the
agency, and, at a minimum, would be compelled to state the bases of the scien-
tific assumptions underlying the agency’s policy decisions.108
Daubert, however, involved the admissibility of scientific evidence under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and thus cannot be exported wholesale as control-
ling authority in the context of agency rulemakings.109  Daubert’s principles of
review, though, are directly applicable to and entirely appropriate for review of
99. Id. at 589-90.
100. See id. at 593.
101. Id. at 594.
102. Id. at 595.
103. 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997).
104. Id. at 146.
105. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
106. 528 U.S. 440, 457 (2000).
107. Id. at 455.
108. Cf. THE ANNAPOLIS CTR., EPIDEMIOLOGY IN DECISION-MAKING 20 (1999) (noting that
Daubert could usefully be applied to agency science so as to expose the bases for agency decisions and
better inform those who bear the costs of a regulation).
109. This Article is concerned only with review of agency rulemaking.  For a discussion of applying
Daubert to environmental litigation, see Charles O. Weller & David B. Grahame, New Approaches to
Environmental Law and Agency Regulation: The Daubert Litigation Approach, 30 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,557 (2000).
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agency decisions.110  Indeed, the APA and decisions rendered under that Act
fully endorse the logic and import of Daubert.  Regulatory Daubert therefore
supplies an ideal framework for judicial review of administrative actions.
B. Daubert Principles and the Administrative Procedure Act
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts must set aside agency deci-
sions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law,” not based on “substantial evidence,” or in excess of
“statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.”111  Moreover, under the APA,
“a sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued except on consideration
of the whole record . . . and supported by and in accordance with . . . reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence.”112  The Supreme Court has established rig-
orous criteria for reviewing agency action under the APA, and for setting aside
such action when the explanation offered by an agency “runs counter to the
evidence before [it].”113
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Co.114 provides a firm basis for importing Daubert into judicial review of agency
action.  There, the Supreme Court reviewed a National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (“NHTSA”) decision rescinding the requirement that new
motor vehicles be equipped with passive restraints.  Finding that the agency had
failed to present an adequate basis and explanation for its decision, the Court
vacated and remanded the agency’s action.115
State Farm requires that agencies engage in reasoned decisionmaking by
complying with rigorous standards that are strikingly similar to the “relevance
and reliability” criteria of Daubert.  The decision requires every agency to
“examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.”116  In reviewing an agency’s explanation for its action under the APA,
courts must “consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”117
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
110. For a further explanation of Daubert’s utility and relevance in the agency context despite the
case’s civil litigation origins, see Alan Charles Raul, Junk Science In, Junk Policy Out: Science and
Administrative Law, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE LAW 41 (N.Y. Acad. of Sciences ed., 1998).
111. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
112. Id. at § 556(d).
113. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 56.
116. Id. at 43 (quotations omitted).
117. Id. (quoting Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974))
(quotations omitted).
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ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.118
As in Daubert, in which courts are admonished not to draw their own scien-
tific conclusions, State Farm cautioned that “[t]he reviewing court should not
attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies.”119  “The scope of review under
the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency . . . .  [The court] may not supply a reasoned
basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”120
NHTSA’s failure to consider or discuss a crucial regulatory option led the
Court to invoke analysis from the earlier case of Burlington Truck Lines v.
United States:121
There are no findings and no analysis here to justify the choice made, no indication of
the basis on which the agency exercised its expert discretion.  We are not prepared to
and the Administrative Procedure Act will not permit us to accept such . . . prac-
tice . . . .  Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process, but unless we
make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, expertise, the
strength of modern government, can become a monster which rules with no practical
limits on its discretion.
We have frequently reiterated that an agency must cogently explain why it has exer-
cised its discretion in a given manner, and we reaffirm this principle again today.
. . . .
. . . It is not infrequent that the available data do not settle a regulatory issue, and
the agency must then exercise its judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities
on the record to a policy conclusion.  Recognizing that policymaking in a complex
society must account for uncertainty . . . does not imply that it is sufficient for an
agency to merely recite the terms ‘substantial uncertainty’ as a justification for its
actions.  As previously noted, the agency must explain the evidence which is available,
and must offer a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.”122
The Court concluded that, “[b]y failing to analyze the continuous seatbelts
option in its own right, the agency has failed to offer the rational connection
between facts and judgment required to pass muster under the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard.”123  The manner in which the Court exercised its power of
review in this case was fully consistent with its earlier pronouncement in Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe124 that agency action should not be
shielded from a “thorough, probing, in-depth review.”125
C. Treatment of Daubert in the Federal Courts
Despite the clear fit between Daubert’s reviewability standards and the
118. Id.
119. Id.; see also id. at 52 (“[W]e do not upset the agency’s view of the facts, but we do appreciate
the limitations of the record in supporting the agency’s decision.”).
120. Id. at 43 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
121. 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962).
122. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48-52 (citations and quotations omitted).
123. Id. at 56.
124. 401 U.S. 402 (1971), abrogated in part, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
125. Id. at 415.
010904 RAUL.DOC 02/11/04  4:16 PM
24 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:7
principles and standards of the APA, no court has yet explicitly invoked Dau-
bert in the course of reviewing agency action.  In fact, two courts have rejected
the application of Daubert principles to judicial review of agency action.  The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Daubert’s standards in
an environmental case because judicial review under Daubert “is intrusive,
undeferential, and not required,” even though the court conceded it “might
assure better documentation of an agency’s scientific decisions.”126  The decision
provided little analysis of the Daubert issues.  The case involved judicial review
of a Forest Service action under the APA.  The appellant merely cited Daubert
in a footnote in support of a non-controversial proposition that courts are able
to review science.  An amicus brief in the same case also invoked Daubert
simply by alluding to a brief it had filed in Daubert itself.127  In short, the litigants
did not truly develop the issue.
In Stewart v. Potts,128 the second case to reject the application of Daubert, the
district court stated that a reviewing court’s only role “is to ensure that the
agency’s decisions are not arbitrary or capricious; it is not to evaluate their sci-
entific methods.”129  Potts involved judicial review of an Army Corps of Engi-
neers “wetlands” action.  The plaintiff cited Daubert extensively, although
merely rhetorically, to support the proposition that an agency may not rely on
junk science.  The government responded that Daubert has no role in APA
review.  The plaintiff did not develop an argument why Daubert should (or
could) be applied to review under the APA.130
Significantly, the Supreme Court, a judge on the D.C. Circuit, and EPA—
three key participants in the agency science arena—have acknowledged the
potential relevance of Daubert-type principles to administrative review.  In
Daubert itself, the Supreme Court recognized that its new “good science” man-
date could have application in the context of regulatory science.  The Court
prominently cited Sheila Jasanoff’s book on regulatory science, The Fifth
Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers,131 for its discussion of the role of
“peer review and regulatory science.”  The pages cited by the Court address the
relationship between good science and the regulatory decisionmaking process.
The Court would not have cited a book focusing exclusively on the role of
regulatory science in EPA and Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) deci-
sionmaking if it had not been comfortable with the notion that the new good-
science mandate announced in Daubert could be extended by analogy to admin-
istrative law and judicial review of agency science.
Likewise, Judge Tatel, in his dissent from the majority opinion in the first
American Trucking decision, cited Daubert for the proposition that EPA must
126. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 622 (7th Cir. 1995).
127. Id.
128. 996 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
129. Id. at 678 n.8 (rejecting application of Daubert).
130. See id.
131. 509 U.S. at 593 (citing JASANOFF, supra note 5, at 61-76).
010904 RAUL.DOC 02/11/04  4:16 PM
Autumn 2003] REGULATORY DAUBERT 25
explain any departures from the recommendations of the Clean Air Scientific
Advisory Committee (“CASAC”).132  Judge Tatel thus recognized that Daubert
principles could promote agency accountability.
EPA has also acknowledged Daubert’s relevance to agency science.  In its
brief in American Trucking, on remand before the D.C. Circuit,133 EPA cited
Daubert for the proposition that peer review is an important tool for assessing
the validity of a scientific technique or methodology.134
The rigorous standards the Supreme Court has set for review of agency sci-
ence and its demonstrated receptiveness to the idea of ensuring “good science”
in the regulatory context in Daubert itself demonstrate an awareness of the
benefits to be gained by applying Daubert-type review.  In fact, regulatory
Daubert would raise the standards of agency science, thereby advancing impor-
tant public policy objectives.  Daubert gatekeeping principles would signifi-
cantly enhance the likelihood that regulatory decisions and actions are based on
the best available science and sound and objective scientific practices.
D. Daubert Application in APA Cases
Sound science objectives are at least as important in the context of govern-
ment regulation affecting the entire nation as they are in litigation affecting a
few private litigants.  EPA is responsible for more science-based regulations
than any other federal agency.  According to a recent article, “[o]f the 137
forthcoming major rules identified by the federal government in October 1999,
the EPA accounted for twenty-eight—over twenty percent of the total—and
more than any other federal agency.”135  Each of EPA’s rules potentially costs
society billions of dollars and aims to protect thousands or even millions of
people.136  The vast consequences of EPA rulemaking justify judicial review
measures designed to ensure such monumental decisions are firmly supported
by available scientific data and well-reasoned analysis.
In American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit recognized the public
policy benefits of requiring EPA to justify its scientific decisionmaking:
Where, as here, Congress has delegated to an administrative agency the critical task of
assessing the public health and the power to make decisions of national import in
which individuals’ lives and welfare hang in the balance, that agency has the heaviest
of obligations to explain and expose every step of its reasoning.137
Accordingly, agency science warrants no greater insulation—and perhaps
132. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Tatel, J., dissenting from
the majority’s holding that the provisions of the CAA under review effected an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power).
133. Brief of EPA, Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 97-1440) (on
file with author).  The D.C. Circuit did not refer to this argument in its opinion.
134. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993)).
135. Adler, supra note 48, at 657-58; see also Hahn, supra note 12, at 2 (discussing the cost of EPA
regulations).
136. See, e.g., Elliott et al., supra note 11, at 10,131 (remarks of Alan Charles Raul).
137. 134 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1998); cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (“[S]ociety
has a minimal concern with the outcome of . . . private suits.”).
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even less—than other government activity.  Courts should recognize that
agency science is no more or less sacrosanct than other government activities,
and merits scrutiny commensurate with its great public importance.
By requiring agencies to expose the bases for their decisions, including their
assumptions and policy-based choices, and to demonstrate that they engage in
reasoned decisionmaking based on relevant and reliable evidence, Daubert
would increase agency documentation of scientific decisions and enhance
agency accountability.138
Daubert and the APA authorities discussed above lend themselves to a
coherent framework for judicial review.  To achieve consistency in the review of
agency action, courts in every case involving agency science should consider
whether:
1. the agency used methodologies and procedures that were reliable and
scientifically valid;
2. the scientific evidence relied upon was relevant for the issues before the
agency;
3. the agency has set forth the scientific assumptions underlying its policy
decisions and exposed any uncertainties;
4. the evidence before the agency supports the conclusion reached;
5. the agency has considered all important factors; and
6. the agency has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, which includes
demonstrating that there is a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made.
Provided the above criteria are met, courts should accord deference to
agencies acting within their scientific expertise.  Agency decisions that rest upon
irrelevant or unreliable scientific evidence should be vacated for an abuse of
discretion.
IV
EXCESSIVE JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCY SCIENCE
Notwithstanding the call for rigorous review in State Farm and other APA
cases, many courts accord extreme, almost slavish deference to agency science.
Applying conventional notions of administrative law, and over-reading Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,139 some courts have
taken an excessively deferential approach to judicial review.  A few such deci-
138. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 622 (7th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that the use of
Daubert-type standards “might assure better documentation of an agency’s scientific decisions”).
139. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  State Farm and Chevron are logically distinct in their respective areas of
application, though those areas may “overlap at the margins,” Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1995), and the precise contours of the overlap are frequently in dispute.  While State Farm eluci-
dated the appropriate standard to be applied to judicial review of agency fact finding, Chevron was
concerned with an agency’s authority to act and the level of deference owed to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of a statute under which it is so authorized.  On the distinct but sometimes overlapping domains of
Chevron and State Farm, see the majority and concurring opinions by Chief Judge Edwards and Judge
Wald in Arent, 70 F.3d at 615-16, 619-20.
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sions are worthy of brief discussion.  It is evident from these cases that a Dau-
bert-type approach to judicial review of agency rulemaking is necessary to
compel agencies to fulfill their obligations to the public interest.
A. Judicial Deference When an Issue Is Framed as “Science”
Several courts have subjected agency decisions to only “minimal standards
of rationality”140 and stated that “courts necessarily must show considerable def-
erence to an agency’s expertise.”141  This overly deferential stance has proven
pervasive.  In the recent case of Sigma-Tau Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Schwetz,142
the Fourth Circuit emphasized that it owed “substantial deference” to the Food
and Drug Administration, the agency whose action was under review.143  At
issue was a challenge to the agency’s approval of a generic version of the levo-
carnitine drug.  The court ultimately upheld the agency’s decision and asserted
that its review of an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is even “more
deferential than that afforded under Chevron.”144  The court thus declined to
“ignore the deference due the FDA and impose exacting evidentiary standards
on its generic drug approval process.”145  According to the court, “the broad def-
erence due [an] agency is all the more warranted when, as here, the regulation
concerns a complex and highly technical regulatory program, in which the iden-
tification and classification of relevant criteria necessarily require significant
expertise and entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.”146
Daubert actually demands that courts recognize the agency’s expertise and
that they not substitute their judgment for that of the agency.147  This rule strikes
an entirely appropriate balance between probing review and judicial deference.
Courts too often fail to achieve such a balance, however, instead endowing
“technical expertise” or “science” with a talismanic power that commands their
retreat from any form of meaningful review.  Professor Wagner has commented
upon the “tendency of many courts to defer to the agency as an expert when the
issue is framed as scientific in nature.”148  Her observation is amply borne out by
the case-law.149
140. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 210 F.3d 396 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
141. Id. at 400 (quotations omitted).
142. 288 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2002).
143. Id. at 146.
144. Id. at 146 (quoting Wyo. Outdoor Council v. United States Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 52 (D.C.
Cir. 1999)) (quotations omitted).
145. Id. at 147.
146. Id. at 146.
147. 509 U.S. at 595.
148. Wagner, supra note 13, at 1664-65 (citing various cases).
149. See, e.g., United States Air Tour Ass’n v. FAA, 298 F.3d 997, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Ulti-
mately . . . the scientific nature of a model does not easily lend itself to judicial review, and our review
proceeds with considerable deference to the agency’s expertise.”) (quotations omitted); Nat’l
Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 287 F.3d 1130, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Where, as here, EPA’s
decision is based on complex scientific or technical analysis, it is entitled to great deference.”) (citations
omitted); Husqvarna v. EPA, 254 F.3d 195, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting a challenge to emissions
standards under the Clean Air Act and reaffirming the principle that a court “must be ‘at its most
010904 RAUL.DOC 02/11/04  4:16 PM
28 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:7
In Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA,150 for example, the petitioner unsuccess-
fully argued that EPA’s promulgation of zero-discharge limits for pollution was
the product of a flawed scientific analysis.151  Specifically rejecting the argument
that no deference is owed when EPA fails to explain its reasoning, the court
concluded that extreme deference was due because “the agency’s decision rests
on an evaluation of complex scientific data within the agency’s technical
expertise.”152  According to the court, “[a]n agency’s choice to proceed on the
basis of ‘imperfect’ information is not arbitrary and capricious unless ‘there is
simply no rational relationship’ between the means used to account for any
imperfections and the situation to which those means are applied.”153
The court in BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. EPA154 affirmed EPA’s effluent
limitations for offshore oil and gas and noted that “[i]n assessing difficult issues
of scientific method and laboratory procedure, we must defer to a great extent
to the expertise of the EPA.”155  Similarly, in Environmental Defense Fund v.
EPA,156 the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s stringent standards for discharge of
PCBs, discounting arguments that the regulations lacked an adequate basis in
the record.  According to the court, “when an agency must resolve issues ‘on
the frontiers of scientific knowledge,’ the reviewing court will uphold agency
conclusions based on policy judgments in lieu of factual determinations.”157  The
court found it sufficient that “the evidence in this case is at least suggestive of
carcinogenicity.”158  The court all but abdicated its judicial review function
entirely, asserting that: “[EPA’s] policy decisions are subject to deferential
review, and its factual conclusions are upheld although they may not be sup-
ported by all the evidence, or even by most of it.”159
The above decisions make evident that many panels defer excessively to any
agency action that contains a scientific component.  In some instances courts
effectively avoid judicial review entirely, preferring instead to defer blindly to
an agency’s decision regardless of its sometimes even obvious flaws.  Such judi-
cial passivity does not enhance democratic accountability.  Chevron and Dau-
bert teach that courts need not—and must not—themselves venture into the
merits of competing or complex scientific findings.  However, courts must
ensure that an agency decision is adequately supported by the record, that the
deferential’ when [the] agency is ‘making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the fron-
tiers of science’”) (citations omitted); Int’l Fabricare Inst. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(“The rationale for deference is particularly strong when the EPA is evaluating scientific data within its
technical expertise.”).
150. 161 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir. 1998).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 933-34 & n.8.
153. Id. at 935 (quoting Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
154. 66 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 1995).
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. 598 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
157. Id. at 82 (quoting Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 833-34 (3d. Cir. 1978)).
158. Id. at 89.
159. Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
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agency has offered a reasoned explanation for that decision—including expos-
ing any underlying assumptions or uncertainties—and that the agency has fol-
lowed the proper procedures in reaching its decision.  Even when courts have
expanded the scope of the agency action that is subject to review, the form of
the review itself has often not been rigorous.
B. Broader, but Not Unduly Probing, Review
Several recent cases have explored the issue of finality, and hence
reviewability, of agency action.  The resulting decisions have tended to find in
favor of reviewability, even when agency action has arguably not been “final”
according to more conventional notions of administrative law.  Nonetheless,
even though the scope of judicial review has broadened, the exercise of review
itself has not always proven sufficiently probing.
The illustrative case of Tozzi v. HHS160 involved a Department of Health
and Human Services (“HHS”) decision to upgrade the chemical dioxin from a
“reasonably anticipated” to a “known” carcinogen.161  As mandated by the
Public Health Service Act,162 the listing was published in HHS’s biennial Report
on Carcinogens.163  The report itself did not give rise to regulation of included
substances.  The agency accordingly opposed judicial review of the listing, argu-
ing that the report lacked the requisite finality.164  The D.C. Circuit rejected this
argument, holding that the listing or reclassification of a substance is a review-
able agency action.165  Tozzi potentially increased the transparency and
reviewability of agency action to a significant degree, in that the court found
that an agency decision is reviewable if it triggers regulatory obligations pursu-
ant to the rules of other regulatory bodies, even without further action by the
deciding agency.166  When evaluating the merits, however, the court ultimately
160. 271 F.3d 301 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
161. Id.
162. Pub. L. No. 95-622, § 262 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 241 (2000)).
163. NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON
CARCINOGENS (8th ed. 1997).
164. Tozzi, 271 F.3d at 310.
165. Id. at 310-11.
166. See id. at 310.  Curiously, the Tozzi court did not rely heavily on either of two key Supreme
Court reviewability decisions.  In Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997), the Supreme Court
found reviewable a biological opinion that prescribed legally binding conditions for carrying out a proj-
ect that would threaten endangered fish.  In American Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 477 (2001), the Supreme
Court held that an EPA implementation policy described in the preamble of a regulation was review-
able, although EPA had stated the policy was merely preliminary and did not bind the states or the
public.  Id. at 477.
For other recent decisions on reviewability of agency action, see, for example, Sierra Club v. United
States Department of Energy, 287 F.3d 1256, 1264 (10th Cir. 2002) (reversing a district court finding that
a DOE decision to issue a road easement was not ripe); Alaska v. EPA, 244 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that administrative orders stating EPA’s position that a mining facility permit had been
improperly issued constituted final agency action even when EPA had not commenced enforcement
proceedings); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that an EPA
guidance document interpreting certain Clean Air Act regulations was final and reviewable).  But see
Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussed supra at
note 85); Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998) (holding that an agency Land and
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failed to fully exercise its powers of judicial review.
The plaintiffs alleged that HHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in relying
on mechanistic rather than epidemiological evidence in its decision to classify
dioxin as a “known” carcinogen.167  The court failed to truly probe the agency’s
decision, instead adopting the “highly deferential” approach to judicial review
of agency science and affirming the agency’s decision.168
A few months after Tozzi, the D.C. Circuit considered a similar case in
which it reviewed an EPA notice denying an industry group’s petition to delete
the substance methanol from the Clean Air Act’s list of “hazardous air pollut-
ants.”169  The court did not express concerns about finality or its ability to review
the agency’s action.  Paradoxically, the nascent qualities of the agency’s action
proved to excuse the agency from engaging in and demonstrating a thorough,
well-reasoned analysis.  In a mere footnote, the court rejected the argument
that EPA was required to issue an extensive decision “that includes the factual
data on which the rule is based, the methodology used in obtaining and analyz-
ing the data, the major legal interpretations and policy considerations underly-
ing the rule, and a response to comments or criticisms of EPA’s proposed
action.”170  According to the court, such requirements applied only to formal
rulemakings.171
Demonstrating extreme deference to the agency, the court affirmed EPA’s
decision and soundly rejected the petitioners’ attacks on the agency’s science,
including allegations that EPA employed an “unexplained, unacknowledged
level of conservatism,”172 and utilized “an untested, experimental approach.”173
Applying an extremely lenient standard of review, the court asserted that it
“may reject an agency’s choice of a scientific model ‘only when the model bears
no rational relationship to the characteristics of the data to which it is
applied.’”174
C. The Expansion of Chevron Deference
The Chevron deference applicable to an agency’s issuance of rules and
regulations might explain the failure by courts to engage in probing review.
Resource Management Plan was not ripe for review because it could be challenged after the plan went
into effect); City of San Diego v. Whitman, 242 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that an EPA letter
stating which statutory framework the agency would apply to a prospective permit was not final agency
action, and therefore not subject to judicial review).
167. Tozzi, 271 F.3d at 311.
168. Id.
169. Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 294 F.3d 113, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing § 112(b) of the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2000)).
170. Id. at 117 n.3 (quoting Petitioner’s Brief, at 45) (quotations omitted).
171. See id.
172. Id. at 121 (quoting Petitioner’s Brief, at 22) (quotations omitted).
173. Id.
174. Am. Forest & Paper, 294 F.3d at 121 (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 562
(D.C. Cir. 2002)).
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Although Christensen v. Harris County175 held that Chevron deference is ordi-
narily only accorded to decisions reached after formal adjudication or notice-
and-comment rulemaking, the Court recently qualified that statement,
explaining that “whether a court should give such deference depends in signifi-
cant part upon the interpretive method used and the nature of the question at
issue.”176  In United States v. Mead Corp.,177 the Court had stated that “the fair
measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been
understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of
the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the
persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”178
In Barnhart v. Walton, the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from the
implications of Christiansen and Mead by extending Chevron deference to a
Social Security Administration position that had been formulated without
formal rulemaking.179  The Court disclaimed any general rule forbidding the
application of Chevron deference to informal agency action.180  At the close of
its opinion, the Court espoused a fairly expansive form of deference, stating:
“The [Social Security Act’s] complexity, the vast number of claims that it
engenders, and the consequent need for agency expertise and administrative
experience lead us to read the statute as delegating to the agency considerable
authority to fill in, through interpretation, matters of detail related to its
administration.”181  The Court’s opinion thus expanded the availability of Chev-
ron deference.
Lower federal courts have accordingly proceeded to grant Chevron defer-
ence to informal agency action.182  In some such cases, courts have relied on the
Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence regarding Chevron to give excessive def-
erence to agencies.  Specifically, courts have relied on Supreme Court pro-
nouncements regarding the importance of agency expertise to the Chevron def-
erence inquiry to justify continuing the practice of excessive deference to
agencies on scientific issues.183  Thus, for example, in Pronsolino v. Nastri,184 the
Ninth Circuit accorded Chevron deference to an EPA decision to apply “total
maximum daily load” (“TMDL”) requirements to a particular river.185  Accord-
175. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
176. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
177. 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
178. Id. at 228; see also id. at 226-27 (“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”).
179. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
180. Id. at 221.
181. Id. at 225.
182. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. HHS, 285 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2002) (according Chevron deference to
an informal agency adjudication under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act,
25 U.S.C. § 450(f) (2000)).
183. See Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 225; Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
184. 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002)
185. Id.  at 1125.
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ing to the court, the regulation under review “is one of numerous interwoven
components that together make up an intricate statutory scheme addressing
technically complex environmental issues.  Confronted with an issue dependent
upon, and the resolution of which will affect, a complicated, science-driven stat-
ute for which the EPA has delegated regulatory authority, we consider the
EPA’s interpretation . . . informative.”186  The court thus simultaneously
afforded Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation and forewent a
probing analysis of the agency’s science.
Similarly, in Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital v. Thompson,187 the
Third Circuit upheld an HHS interpretation of the Balanced Budget Reform
Act after determining that the interpretation was entitled to Chevron defer-
ence.188  The court held that “[t]he broad deference of Chevron is even more
appropriate in cases that involve a complex and highly technical regulatory pro-
gram . . . which require[s] significant expertise and entail[s] the exercise of
judgment grounded in policy concerns.”189  Though the court did devote some
analysis to the agency’s reasons for its decision, it also relied heavily on Chev-
ron deference and on its finding that the statutory scheme at issue was “com-
plex and highly technical” to conclude that the agency’s interpretation was
permissible.190
While courts should properly defer to agencies within the boundaries of
Chevron, deference should not function as a pretext for abdicating responsibil-
ity for meaningful judicial review.  Daubert principles could easily and properly
inform Chevron analysis without eliminating Chevron deference.  Incorporating
Daubert-type review would help ensure that Chevron is not extended beyond its
intended scope.191
Under regulatory Daubert, agency actions would receive appropriate Chev-
ron deference provided the agency relies on relevant and reliable science, offers
a rational explanation for its decision, and fully discloses its policy choices and
default assumptions, including any relevant scientific bases for its determina-
tion.192  Utilizing Chevron to compound the already excessive deference often
accorded agency decisions is dangerous, however, particularly when agencies
are not held politically accountable through effective checks on the regulatory
process.193  In addition to carrying significant social consequences, excessive def-
186. Id. at 1133 (relying on Mead, 533 U.S. at 234); see also id. at 1134 (“EPA has specialized expe-
rience regarding the Clean Water Act which this court lacks.”).
187. 297 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2002).
188. Id. at 282.
189. Id. (quotations omitted).
190. See id. at 282-85.  Cf. Am. Corn Growers v. EPA, 291 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Garland, J.,
dissenting) (relying on Chevron to conduct an excessively deferential analysis of EPA action and to
argue that the group-BART provisions of EPA’s Haze Rule were reasonable).
191. See discussion infra Part V.C.  For a good example of how Chevron and State Farm may be suc-
cessfully reconciled, see A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
192. See Elliott et al., supra note 11, at 10,130 (comments of Alan Charles Raul).
193. See id. at 10,129 (comments of Alan Charles Raul) (remarking on the “fallacy of the degree of
effectiveness of presidential and congressional oversight with regard to agency rulemaking,” and noting
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erence to agency action is fundamentally incompatible with agencies’ recently
articulated mandate to ensure the quality of information they disseminate.
V
PROGRESS TOWARD PROBING REVIEW OF AGENCY SCIENCE
Despite the prevailing pattern of excessive deference among the federal
courts, certain judicial panels do probe agency science in a manner akin to the
regulatory-Daubert approach advocated here.194  The representative cases dis-
cussed below demonstrate both that Daubert-type review is possible and that
Daubert principles would not impose a radical change or inject wholly unfamil-
iar practices into the current form of judicial review.  Rather, as these cases
demonstrate, regulatory Daubert is fully consistent with rigorous review under
the APA.  Notwithstanding the existing willingness of some panels to delve into
science issues, consistency and predictably of review would improve if Daubert
were incorporated in administrative law.
Although the current judicial approach to agency science has been
extremely uneven, even among different panels of the same court, certain deci-
sions have articulated and followed Daubert-type principles.  In the particularly
noteworthy decision of Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA,195 the D.C. Circuit
ruled against EPA under the SDWA because the agency did not use the best
available scientific evidence as required by law.196  The preamble to the agency’s
rule made it clear that the scientific evidence supported the establishment of an
above-zero “maximum contaminant level goal” (“MCLG”) for chloroform.197
EPA nonetheless proceeded to set a zero threshold for this substance.  The
court vacated the rule, finding that the agency had acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously by disregarding its own scientific findings.198  In effect, EPA’s decision
was vacated because it was not supported by Daubert-defined reliable evidence.
It should be noted that this decision construed the Safe Drinking Water Act,
a statute that specifically mandated EPA to use the “best available, peer-
reviewed science and supporting studies conducted in accordance with sound
and objective scientific practices.”199  The agency had also filed a motion with
the court stating that it “no longer believed that it should continue to defend its
original decision.”200  It is unclear whether the court would have reached the
that Chevron was founded on the assumption that agencies are politically accountable).
194. It should be noted that pre-Chevron judicial review of agency action was often intense.  The
high-water mark of such review was Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976), in which Judge
Leventhal asserted: “Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly—and courts
have upheld such delegation—because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the
delegated power within statutory limits.”  Id. at 86.
195. 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1290.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(A) (2000).
200. Motion filed by EPA in Chlorine Chemistry Council, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (on file
with author).
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same result had it not been bound to implement the best-available-science stan-
dard.  Now that the OMB Data Quality Guidelines impose heightened stan-
dards for agencies, courts should consistently examine agency decisions with a
level of scrutiny that comports with the best-available-science requirement.
Such an approach is crucial given the indications that EPA has endeavored to
dilute this requirement in its own guidelines.
A. Courts Must Review for Substantial Evidence and Reasoned
Decisionmaking
Ensuring that agency decisions are supported by substantial evidence and
are the product of reasoned decisionmaking is an effective means of ascertain-
ing whether an agency relied on relevant and reliable science.  Thus, in National
Lime Ass’n v. EPA,201 the court compelled EPA to demonstrate that the factual
basis upon which the agency relied with regard to certain emissions standards
was sound: “An agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated
by the agency.”202  Agencies must demonstrate the reasonableness of their
approach “with substantial evidence, not mere assertions.”203
Agencies must also engage in reasoned decisionmaking.204  The D.C. Circuit
explicated this requirement in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,205 in which it
rejected certain growth factors EPA had generated pursuant to the Clean Air
Act:
EPA has not fully explained the bases on which it chose to use one set of growth-rate
projections for costs and another for budgets, nor has it addressed what appear to be
stark disparities between its projections and real world observations.  With its delicate
balance of thorough record scrutiny and deference to agency expertise, judicial review
can occur only when agencies explain their decisions with precision, for it will not do
for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency’s action.206
In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,207 the Fifth Circuit struck down EPA’s
asbestos ban, citing the agency’s faulty analysis.  EPA had neither considered
all of the necessary evidence nor heeded the statutory language requiring the
least burdensome regulation, and the agency had failed to consider the alterna-
tives Congress set forth.208  In light of these defects, EPA’s action lacked a rea-
201. 233 F.3d 625, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
202. Id. (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50) (quotations omitted).
203. Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  The bases for
agency action must be both rational and supported by the record.  See W.R. Grace & Co. v. EPA, 261
F.3d 330, 338 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that “ordinarily we ‘may not uphold the order unless it is sustain-
able on the agency’s findings’” and conclusory findings are insufficient to establish a rational basis).
204. A study of EPA litigation found that the agency has been losing a large number of cases in
recent years.  EPA’s failure to explain its reasoning was a key factor in the agency’s losses.  EPA:
Agency Loses About Half of Cases in D.C. Circuit in Recent Years, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), No. 103, at
B-1 (May 26, 2000).
205. 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
206. Id. at 1054-55 (citations omitted).
207. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
208. Id.
010904 RAUL.DOC 02/11/04  4:16 PM
Autumn 2003] REGULATORY DAUBERT 35
soned basis.209
Reasoned decisionmaking requires that agencies demonstrate a rational link
between their decisions and the evidence.210  In National Mining Ass’n v. Bab-
bitt,211 the D.C. Circuit invalidated as arbitrary and capricious regulations prom-
ulgated by the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement.  Noting
that “we would be obliged to defer to a reasonable agency determination of
probabilities—including predictions based on its own expertise and policies—
”212 the court nonetheless found that “the government has failed to justify its
presumption . . . . Indeed, the government apparently concedes that it is not
supported by available science.”213  The agency itself must supply an explanation
for its actions.  Thus, “[when] the agency has failed . . . to explain the path that
it has taken, we have no choice but to remand for a reasoned explanation for
[its] conclusion.”214
The Ninth Circuit has also struck down a regulation of the National Marine
Fisheries Service when the agency failed to use the “best scientific information
available,” as mandated by the Magnuson-Stevens Act.215  In Midwater Trawlers
Cooperative v. Department of Commerce,216 the court rejected the agency’s rule
because the justification published in the Federal Register was “devoid of any
stated scientific rationale.”217  Relying on State Farm, the court found the
agency’s action arbitrary and capricious because it “was a product of pure
political compromise, not reasoned scientific endeavor.”218  The court admon-
ished that “the best available politics does not equate to the best available
science as required by the Act.”219
209. See id. at 1224 (“[E]xpertise . . . is not a universal talisman affording the EPA unbridled lati-
tude to act as it chooses.”); id. at 1227 (commenting that EPA engaged in speculation and displayed a
“cavalier attitude toward the use of its own data”).
210. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting EPA’s decision when
there were discrepancies between the conclusions suggested by EPA’s data and the ultimate agency
decision); Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (remanding due to the
agency’s failure to explain how the data supported the conclusion reached); Oz Tech. Inc. v. EPA, 129
F.3d 631, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
211. 172 F.3d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
212. Id. at 913.
213. Id. at 912.
214. Tex Tin Corp. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1321, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  In Leather Industries of America
v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the court invalidated certain EPA “clean sludge” caps,
finding that the caps set were arbitrary and not related to risk.  Other caps also lacked a rational basis
because the agency had provided no explanation for ignoring the information before it and instead
adopting extremely conservative assumptions.  Id. at 403.  EPA “may not engage in sheer guesswork.”
Id. at 408 (citation omitted).
215. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2000).
216. 282 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2002).
217. Id. at 720.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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B. Agencies Must Expose Their Assumptions and Use Logically Defensible
Models
To be fully accountable for their decisions, agencies must expose their
assumptions and rely on logically defensible models and methodologies.  The
D.C. Circuit recently remanded EPA’s electric generating unit growth factors
and explained:
There is no question that agency determinations based upon highly complex and
technical matters are entitled to great deference.  The EPA has undoubted power to
use predictive models, . . . but it must explain the assumptions and methodology used
in preparing the model and provide a complete analytic defense should the model be
challenged.
. . . The EPA’s decision . . . may well have been reasonable . . . .  However, there is
no way for us to tell because the EPA never offered an explanation.220
C. Deference Must Be Balanced Against Probing Judicial Review
Several courts have also deftly articulated the conditions under which Chev-
ron deference is due and the appropriate level of deference to be accorded to
agency decisions.  As one court recognized, “If we are to earn our keep . . . judi-
cial deference to the agency’s modeling cannot be utterly boundless.”221  Tradi-
tional deference to agency expertise should apply as long as the agency acts
within delegated statutory authority, considers all relevant factors, and demon-
strates a reasonable connection between the facts in the record and the agency’s
decision.222  In A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala,223 the D.C. Circuit, relying heavily
on State Farm, recognized that:
Deferring to an agency’s exercise of its discretion, however, is not tantamount to abdi-
cating the judiciary’s responsibility under the Administrative Procedure Act to set
aside agency actions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.  To enable us to fulfill our duty, an agency must cogently
explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner, and that explanation
must be sufficient to enable us to conclude that the agency’s action was the product of
reasoned decisionmaking.224
Courts will not simply assume, therefore, that the agency has engaged in
reasoned decisionmaking.  The agency must provide an explanation sufficient to
withstand the court’s scrutiny.  In Wyoming v. United States,225 for example, the
Tenth Circuit found reviewable the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s
refusal to allow the state of Wyoming to vaccinate elk against the brucellosis
disease.  Rejecting the argument that the agency had unbridled discretion to
make such decisions, the court quoted a U.S. Department of the Interior opin-
220. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 251 F.3d 1026, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations
omitted); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (requiring EPA to
demonstrate that its chosen methodology produced accurate results that supported EPA’s conclusion).
221. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
222. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 801-02 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
223. 62 F.3d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
224. Id. at 1491 (citations and quotations omitted).
225. 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002).
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ion requiring that agency action be reasonable and appropriate,226 and noted
that the use of sound professional judgment was required by statute.227  The
court relied on Overton Park228 for the proposition that the agency’s decision
was subject to “thorough, probing, in-depth review” under the APA.229  The
court could consequently compel the agency to explain the basis for its deci-
sion.230
The D.C. Circuit, in NRDC v. Daley,231 clarified the role of Chevron defer-
ence in reviewing agency science when it reversed the district court’s decision to
uphold a fishing quota established by the National Marine Fisheries Service.232
The appellants had challenged the Service’s faulty analysis in reaching its deci-
sion.  The district court perceived certain ambiguities in the governing statute,
but afforded deference to the Service pursuant to step two of Chevron.233  On
appeal, the D.C. Circuit rejected this uncritical deference, finding instead: “This
case presents a situation in which the Service’s quota for the 1999 summer
flounder harvest so completely diverges from any realistic meaning of the Fish-
ery Act that it cannot survive scrutiny under Chevron Step Two.”234  The court
observed:
The Service resists this result by suggesting that we owe deference to the agency’s
scientific judgments.  While this may be so, we do not hear cases merely to rubber
stamp agency actions.  To play that role would be tantamount to abdicating the judici-
ary’s responsibility under the Administrative Procedure Act.  The Service cannot rely
on reminders that its scientific determinations are entitled to deference in the absence
of reasoned analysis to cogently explain why its additional recommended measures
satisfied the Fishery Act’s requirements.  Indeed, we can divine no scientific judgment
upon which the Service concluded that its measures would satisfy its statutory man-
date.235
Agencies cannot merely rely on Chevron and on assertions of scientific
expertise to evade their responsibility to engage in reasoned decisionmaking.
D. Agencies Must Follow Their Own Precedent and Procedures
Courts engaging in agency science review should ascertain whether agencies
have followed their own precedents and procedures.  Ensuring consistency in
decisions provides a valuable and effective check on the quality of agency sci-
ence, without requiring judges to draw their own scientific conclusions.  Thus, in
226. Id. at 1236.
227. Id. at 1237 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(1) (2000)).
228. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
229. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1238.
230. See id. at 1240 (“[T]he law requires answers.  For instance, the FWS has never explained why
the State’s proposal would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of federal objec-
tives.”) (quotations omitted).
231. 209 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 751-52.
234. Id. at 753.
235. Id. at 755-56 (citations and quotations omitted).
010904 RAUL.DOC 02/11/04  4:16 PM
38 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:7
Troy Corp. v. Browner,236 the D.C. Circuit invalidated as arbitrary and capri-
cious EPA’s addition of two chemicals to the Toxic Release Inventory because
the listings departed from agency precedent and regulations.  Similarly, in BFI
Waste Systems of North America, Inc. v. FAA,237 the court vacated a Federal
Aviation Administration action because the agency violated its own procedures
by conducting an aeronautical study without circulating notice of it and without
convening with interested parties to discuss its action.238  The agency also failed
to explain its reasons for declining to follow its procedures.  This unexplained
failure to comply with the agency’s own standards and procedures was arbitrary
and capricious under the APA.239
VI
THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY DAUBERT ON
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS
The application of Daubert principles does not automatically lead to invali-
dation of agency decisions.  Regulatory Daubert may actually protect agencies
from capricious court rejection of agency actions.  The case of Supreme Beef
Processors, Inc. v. USDA240 is illustrative.  There, the Fifth Circuit invalidated
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (“USDA”) performance standard for
salmonella bacteria in meat by holding that the relevant statute regulated only
the unsanitary conditions of the meat plant itself; contaminants present in raw
materials were not within the statute’s reach.241  The USDA sought to bring its
regulation within the ambit of the statute by arguing that the presence or
absence of salmonella serves as a proxy for adulteration.242  The court rejected
this argument without a probing examination of the agency’s science.  In a foot-
note, the court appeared to dismiss the standard based largely on a casual
observation that “several equivocal statements about the effectiveness of salmo-
nella levels as a proxy for pathogen controls appear in the final rule.”243  Had the
court instead engaged in a careful review of the evidence before the agency and
assessed whether the agency demonstrated a rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made, the performance standard may have been
upheld.  By providing consistent standards for judicial review, Daubert compels
courts to focus on the quality of the agency’s science, thus protecting agency
decisions from invalidation through arbitrary reliance on isolated statements in
an agency rule.
This principle is demonstrated in the recent case of City of Waukesha v.
236. 120 F.3d 277, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
237. 293 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
238. See id. at 532.
239. Id. at 533.  The FAA’s action also suffered from the additional defect that the agency’s factual
conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence.
240. 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001).
241. Id. at 441-42.
242. Id. at 440.
243. Id. at 440 n.32.
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EPA.244  The petitioners in that case—various water utility interests—challenged
EPA’s regulations establishing standards for radionuclide levels in public water
systems pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water Act.245  The petitioners contended,
in part, that EPA had failed to use the best available science, as required by the
SDWA.  The court upheld EPA’s actions after engaging in a probing review to
ensure that the agency’s methodology and conclusions were sound.  The court
explained that, while deference was owed when matters were within an agency’s
scientific expertise, “[n]onetheless, our review must ensure that the EPA has
examined the relevant data and has articulated an adequate explanation for its
actions.”246  The court conducted a searching examination of the record, and
found that “the agency adequately explained its reasons” for its actions,247
“sufficiently justified its choice of model,”248 and drew logical inferences from
the evidence before it.249  In conducting its analysis, the court did not substitute
its own judgment for that of the agency, but rather recognized that when the
evidence supported more than one outcome, “[t]he resolution of this contradic-
tory data lies well within EPA’s expertise.”250
Regulatory Daubert would not work a radical change in the current
approach to review of agency science.  Rather, Daubert would prompt all courts
to follow the lead of the many courts that have already begun to apply rigorous
standards of review to agency science.  Daubert would help overcome
“extreme” deference to agency science, and would supply a framework for
coherent and consistent judicial review.  Regulatory Daubert is merely a
conceptual framework for emboldening judges to examine methodologies and
expose agencies’ underlying assumptions and uncertainties.  Given the search-
ing review already practiced by numerous courts, regulatory Daubert would be
a conscious—but relatively modest—effort to unify reviewing standards.
Daubert review comports with the Data Quality Guidelines’ call for trans-
parency; Daubert review would require agencies to disclose the bases for their
decisions, as well as any underlying uncertainties.  In fact, various components
of the OMB Data Quality Guidelines mirror the relevance and reliability
requirements of Daubert.  OMB has defined “utility” as the usefulness of the
information to potential users, and “objectivity” as ensuring that “the dissemi-
nated information is being presented in an accurate, clear, complete, and unbi-
ased manner, and as a matter of substance, is accurate, reliable, and unbi-
ased.”251  Applying Daubert to agency actions would enable judges to review
agencies’ compliance with their new good-science mandate.  To be effective,
244. 320 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2000).
246. City of Waukesha, 320 F.3d at 247 (quotations and citations omitted).
247. Id. at 248.
248. Id. at 249.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 252.
251. Information Quality Guidelines, supra note 52, at 370.  In addition, as in Daubert, peer review
gives rise to a presumption of objectivity or reliability under the Guidelines.  See id. at 371.
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judicial review must remain in step with evolving agency responsibilities.
A. Judges Would Continue to Defer to Reasoned Decisionmaking
Applying Daubert principles in the administrative law context would not
empower judges to substitute their conclusions for those of agency scientists or
experts.  While courts may invalidate agency action that is not the product of
reasoned decisionmaking, they may not dictate a conclusion not reached by the
agency.  In Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,252 for example, the court explained
that “a reasonable prediction deserves our deference notwithstanding that there
might also be another reasonable view.”253  Similarly, in Cement Kiln Recycling
Coalition v. EPA,254 the court vacated EPA regulations when the agency failed
to consider all of the relevant factors, but noted that “it is not our place to
dictate to the Agency how to account for [the additional] variables.”255
Agencies are permitted to make “reasonable extrapolations from some reli-
able evidence.”256  In 1000 Friends of Maryland v. Browner,257 the court upheld
EPA’s decision that a revised motor vehicle emissions budget was adequate,
and explained that, to satisfy the basis-and-purpose requirements of the APA,
an agency need only “enable a reviewing court to see what major issues of
policy were ventilated . . . and why the agency reacted to them the way it did.”258
When the issues before an agency are relatively concrete, and agency decisions
are capable of being supported by objective scientific proof, judicial review
should be at its most rigorous.  In contrast, when agencies confront issues that
are “elusive” or “not easily defined,” review should be more deferential.259
B. Judges Would Serve Only as “Gatekeepers”
Judges under regulatory Daubert would work within the APA to assess the
validity of the scientific methodologies and principles employed by agencies to
reach their decisions.  Under regulatory Daubert, it would be appropriate for a
court to review the methodology adopted by an underlying scientific study.  An
agency decision based on a study linking PCBs to skin cancer, for example,
could be challenged because of improper statistical techniques or the failure to
account for obvious confounding environmental influences.
Courts would not dictate agencies’ approaches, however, and would not
identify specific, additional methodologies for agencies to employ.  In addition,
as a recent study conducted by Professors Schroeder and Glicksman analyzing
federal courts’ treatment of environmental policymaking found, “EPA’s deci-
252. 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
253. Id. at 1053 (quotations and citation omitted).
254. Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
255. Id. at 866.
256. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d in part on other grounds,
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
257. 265 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2001).
258. Id. at 238 (citations omitted).
259. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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sions to reject data or studies based on flaws identified by the Agency were . . .
immune from successful attack.”260
C. Judges Would Not Make Policy Choices
Daubert obligates judges to scrutinize only scientific “principles and meth-
odology, not . . . the conclusions that they generate.”261  Daubert does not allow
judges to determine outcomes or to decide on matters of policy; it merely
secures minimum standards of scientific validity.
A recent Second Circuit decision scrutinized EPA’s science but respected
the agency’s determination on the appropriate margin of safety for phosphorus
levels when limited scientific information was available.262  The court explained:
[R]equiring that EPA show a rigorous scientific methodology dictates one course of
action as opposed to another and would effectively prevent the agency from acting in
situations where action is required in the face of a clear public health or environ-
mental danger but the magnitude of that danger cannot be effectively quantified . . . .
[S]imply to reject EPA’s efforts to implement the CWA because it must respond to
real water quality problems without the guidance of a rigorously precise methodology
would essentially nullify the exercise of agency discretion in the form of best profes-
sional judgment.263
In Sierra Club v. EPA, 264 the D.C. Circuit rejected the methodology EPA
used to establish performance standards for medical waste incinerators.  The
court did not substitute its own standard, but instead allowed the agency to
either make a new determination or explain its results.  As the court explained:
With these numbers, EPA’s method looks hopelessly irrational . . . . EPA has never
explained why it made sense to use the highest of its test run data to make up the gap.
Nonetheless, we do not vacate the standard.  It is possible that EPA may be able to
explain it, and the Sierra Club has expressly requested that we leave the current regu-
lations in place during any remand, rather than eliminate any federal control at all. We
therefore remand the floor determinations for existing units for further explanation by
EPA.265
D. Judges Would Not Exercise Scientific and Technical Expertise
Judges would examine the integrity of the scientific process, not perform
scientific analyses.  Notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit’s decision to remand
EPA’s medical waste incinerator standards in Sierra Club, the court noted that
“EPA typically has wide latitude in determining the extent of data-gathering
necessary to solve a problem.  We generally defer to an agency’s decision to
proceed on the basis of imperfect scientific information, rather than to invest
resources to conduct the perfect study.”266  The D.C. Circuit has said that courts
“will examine each step of EPA’s analysis to satisfy ourselves that the agency
260. Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 43.
261. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
262. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001).
263. Id. at 103 (citations omitted).
264. Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
265. Id. at 664.
266. Id. at 662.
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has not departed from a rational course, [but] we will not take it upon our-
selves, as nonstatisticians, to perform our own statistical analysis—a job more
properly left to the agency to which it was delegated.”267
In Edison Electric Institute v. EPA,268 the court rejected EPA’s application of
a toxicity test to mineral wastes, as the court was unable to discern the requisite
“rational relationship” between the scientific approach and the issue under con-
sideration.  When EPA supplied a reasonable explanation for its other actions,
however, the court declined to substitute its own judgment in place of the
agency’s scientific expertise, stating, “[h]appily, it is not for the judicial branch
to undertake comparative evaluations of conflicting scientific evidence.  Our
review aims only to discern whether the Agency’s evaluation was rational.”269
Indeed, Professors Schroeder and Glicksman’s study of judicial review of EPA
science revealed that “[e]ven in cases where courts otherwise took EPA to task,
when both petitioners and the EPA produced evidence to support their posi-
tions, courts typically deferred to EPA’s interpretation of the weight of the evi-
dence rather than deciding that the petitioners’ evidence was stronger than that
relied on by EPA.”270
E. Regulatory Daubert Would Not Impose New Procedural Obligations on
Agencies
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,271 the Supreme Court
held that federal courts may not require agencies to adopt particular proce-
dures.  Daubert review would not interfere with the procedural aspects of
agency action.  While courts must ensure that an agency has followed its own
procedures,272 they will not prescribe new procedures for the agency.  This is
clear from State Farm, which provides the basis for incorporating Daubert prin-
ciples into review of agency action.  There, the Court made clear that while it
was setting forth the appropriate standards for judicial review, it was not impos-
ing any specific procedures for the agency to follow in reaching its decisions.273
VII
CONCLUSION
The benefits of bringing Daubert principles into administrative law would be
numerous, although the impact would not be radical.  Given that the APA fully
supports Daubert-type review, and that many courts have already incorporated
the appropriate principles into their judicial review practices, regulatory Dau-
267. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 802 (1998).
268. 2 F.3d 438, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
269. Id. at 451 (citations omitted).
270. Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 43.
271. 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
272. See BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., Inc. v. FAA, 293 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacating an action
that violated the FAA’s own procedures, but not prescribing new procedures for the agency to follow).
273. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50-51 (1983).
010904 RAUL.DOC 02/11/04  4:16 PM
Autumn 2003] REGULATORY DAUBERT 43
bert would introduce relatively modest reforms of the judicial review process.
Daubert’s benefits would nonetheless be significant and would further the
crucial goal of compelling agency accountability.
Junk science hurts the public.  Environmental and public health protection
is crucial to the well-being of the nation, but so are due process and government
integrity.  If agencies may justify their policy preferences based on junk science,
government accountability, and perhaps even public health, might suffer
gravely.  Junk science can lead agencies to foist misleading remedial measures
on the public, thereby diverting or misdirecting regulatory efforts from more
effectively serving the public interest.  Bad science is enormously costly.  In
remarks before the House Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources,
and Regulatory Affairs, William L. Kovacs, vice president of the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, cited examples of EPA programs that imposed billions of dollars
of costs on businesses, industry, and state and local governments.  After the
money had been spent, it was discovered that EPA lacked the data to support
the huge costs it had imposed.274  Poor science results in tremendous
misallocation of public resources.
Agencies have a duty to respect good science.  If agencies cannot establish a
threat to public health or the environment after applying accepted standards of
scientific inquiry and evaluating the best available empirical data, they must not
be allowed to compensate by manipulating either the data or the process to
reach a desired outcome.  Even the noblest end does not justify resort to ille-
gitimate means.
Courts must not let agencies continue to rely upon unreliable science.
Today, too many district and appellate courts allow federal agencies to base sci-
entific judgments on unreliable or pseudo-scientific evidence because of mis-
guided “extreme” deference to such agencies’ scientific expertise.  Agencies
have exploited such judicial deference to conceal arbitrary judgments and
default assumptions, as well as to dress up policy preferences as hard science.
Regulatory Daubert would promote greater regulatory accountability.  It
would empower federal judges to probe the scientific methodologies and prin-
ciples relied on by agencies.  This would require agencies to expose their judg-
ments, assumptions, and policies to judicial scrutiny, as well as to public and
congressional accountability.275  If agencies were aware that their scientific deci-
sionmaking would be more closely scrutinized, they would by necessity improve
their decisionmaking, such as by providing better documentation of their find-
ings and the reasons for their actions and by exposing the assumptions and
uncertainties underlying their decisions.276
Agencies would have to follow best scientific practices.  Daubert principles
274. See Kovacs Testimony, supra note 14, at 11-13.
275. See Wagner, supra note 13, at 1686 (“An agency’s lack of explicitness regarding the areas of
scientific uncertainty . . . prevents policymakers and the public from reviewing the agency’s policy
judgments.”).
276. See Elliott et al., supra note 11, at 10,130 (remarks of Alan Charles Raul).
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would deter agencies from relying on outdated, shoddy, or goal-oriented sci-
ence, such as the assumption that was struck down in Chlorine Chemistry Coun-
cil that every carcinogen, like chloroform in that case, operates in a linear,
“non-threshold” fashion.277  Greater scientific accountability would result from
Daubert-type scrutiny, thereby improving the quality of federal scientific deci-
sionmaking and assuring that agencies’ underlying policy choices are consistent
with law and congressional intent.
Daubert would require disclosure of “fudge factors.”  To survive judicial
review under a Daubert model, agencies would need to identify the most reli-
able and relevant science for the issue at hand, explain the reasoning behind
their acceptance or rejection of such science, and expose relevant default
assumptions, policy judgments, and scientific uncertainties.  Professors Schroe-
der and Glicksman found that courts are best equipped and most willing to
invalidate EPA action “in the absence of any supporting evidence [for the
agency’s scientific reasoning], if EPA completely failed to explain its position, if
EPA’s reasoning process [wa]s marred by an obvious gap in logic, or if that pro-
cess [wa]s internally inconsistent or inconsistent with past practice.”278  Once an
agency fully and properly disclosed its assumptions, judgments, and uncertain-
ties, its decisions would continue to be entitled to deference.  Daubert principles
would also promote peer review by encouraging agencies to obtain critical and
independent scientific evaluation of the evidence on which they intend to rely.
Daubert would promote consistency in judicial review of agency decisions by
establishing a more refined, uniform mode of analysis.  The current review
framework of “extreme” deference that many courts apply conflicts with the
more probing scrutiny of other courts.  As Professor Wagner has noted in the
course of her own call for reform, consistency in judicial review would promote
agency efficiency.279
A Daubert framework would advance the rule of law and sound public
policy, both of which are better served by the adoption of a new framework for
judicial review of agency science influenced by the standards endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Daubert, Joiner, Kumho Tire, and Weisgram.  Applying Dau-
bert principles under the Administrative Procedure Act would sharpen judicial
oversight, to the benefit of the nation’s regulatory decisionmaking and, there-
fore, to the benefit of the nation as a whole.
277. Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
278. Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 43.
279. Wagner, supra note 13, at 1716.
